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REPRESENTATIVE EGOS

The Enigma of Felix FrankfurterBy H.N. Hirsch. New York: Basic
Books, 1981. Pp. 253. $14.95.
Independent Journey: The Life of William 0. Douglas. By James F
Simon. New York: Harper & Row, 1980. Pp. 502. $16.95.

Reviewed by GeorgeKannar*

Political historians take for granted that it matters who wins an
election. Military historians routinely attribute battles lost or won to
the talents of particular generals. But the suggestion that particular
judges make a difference involves questions of a different order in a
political system premised on the notion that government consists "of
laws, and not of men."' Consequently, simply by taking up the enterprise, every judicial biographer necessarily becomes something of a
legal realist. Only if "the Constitution is what the judges say it is" does
it matter who is talking.
In retrospect, what is most surprising about the legal realists'
focus on judicial personality is how long it took to develop. Half a
century elapsed following the establishment of the modern law school
before the simple perception that judges are people achieved academic
legitimacy, and judicial "neutrality," like the closely linked concept of
"legal science," clearly became an ideology as well as an ideal. The
imprint of the individual judge on adjudication has, of course, always
been most apparent on the Supreme Court, where the numbers are
small, the powers are great, and the Justices are not obliged to hear
most of the cases on their calendar.' Yet the role of personal and politi* B.A., Yale College, 1970; J.D., Harvard University, 1977; Staff attorney,

American Civil Liberties Union national office.
MAss. CONST. of 1779 (original draft).
It may also be worth noting that while the Justices' discretion has attracted the
most scholarly and public attention, one can make a very strong argument that the
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cal factors in Supreme Court adjudication, historically underemphasized by the ideology of "neutrality," has of late been further obscured
by commentators intent on probing the Justices' personalities to the
exclusion of the ideological, intellectual, and institutional factors bearing on their work.' Accordingly, contemporary biographers of
Supreme Court Justices face a complicated corrective task: describing
the effect on a highly personalized institution of one personality
among nine, without slighting the professional and institutional framework that constrains, controls, and structures the way the entire group
behaves.
Christopher Lasch's comment that "the connection between biography and history is never altogether clear"' 4 is particularly applicable
to biographies of Supreme Court Justices. To be sure, all of the Justices are historically important; their total number is barely a hundred,
and all have wielded great power. But assessing the historical significance of any one particular Justice is still a difficult task. Unlike many
other famous people, famous judges acquire their historical significance solely on account of, and through, their institutional context,
discretion of lower courts, particularly trial courts, is equally-if not
more-significant to the legal system as a whole. Factfinding, the granting of stays,
the shaping of discovery, and the admission or exclusion of particular items of
evidence-all trial court decisions that are virtually unreviewable by higher
courts-surely have as much impact on the day-in, day-out administration of justice
as do all but the most momentous Supreme Court decisions. In particular, the
"clearly erroneous" standard for appellate review of trial court factfinding shields a
multitude of discretionary, and often arbitrary, choices from meaningful "legal"
review. Moreover, it does so in a manner that isvirtually undetectable absent detailed
investigation beyond the official record of the case.
' See B. WOODWARD &S.
4 C.

LASCH,

THE

ARMSTRONG, THE BRE=n N (1979).
NEW RADICALISM IN AMERICA: THE INTELLECTUAL AS A

SOCIAL TYPE xvii (1965). Lasch's own solution to the problem of making this connection was to adopt a sociological approach, to use individual character portraits as
illustrations of an emerging social "type' In this, of course, he tracks a long and
honorable tradition stretching back to Plutarch and subsequently invoked by Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Lytton Strachey, Daniel Aaron, and Richard Hofstadter, to name

only a few. See R. EMERSON,
VICTORIANS
AMERICAN

(1918); D.
POLITICAL

REPRESENTATIVE MEN (1850); L. STRACHEY, EMINENT
AARON, MEN OF GOOD HOPE (1951); R. HOFSTADER, THE
TRADITION (1948). The same approach has been tried with

respect to the judiciary. See G. WHITE, THE

AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION

(1976).
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through what they do as judges.I Thousands of other people-lawyers, law professors, and law students-do almost identical work, and
often do it more ably than the Justices do. But Justices, unlike philosophers, artists, or law professors, can make their ideas the law.
While this unique power may ultimately matter most from the
standpoint of history, how the Justices reach their results matters too.
The quality of judicial craftsmanship may well affect the extent to
which succeeding Justices, and even lower courts, defer to those
results. Judicial biography thus adds a new twist to the old historiographic problem of reconciling ends and means. Supreme Court biographers not only must ask whether one justifies the other, they must
evaluate each independently as well.
A further complication for the Supreme Court biographer is the
fact that the Justices sit as a group. As Alexander Bickel correctly
pointed out, the Supreme Court "is never, like other institutions,
renewed at a single stroke. No one or two changes, not even if they
include the advent of a new Chief Justice, are apt to be... immediately momentous. ...

Justices are time bombs, not warheads that

explode on impact" 6 Consequently, while the Court's opinions are sufficient for most practicing lawyers, to the biographer or historian they
represent merely the end product of a complicated interaction which is
the true subject of their study. As Felix Frankfurter noted, both
before and after8 his own appointment, the Court's opinions are inevitably "symphonies, not solos," reflecting a largely invisible process of
compromise and accommodation.
, Swisher, The Judge in HistoricalPerspective, 24 IND. L.J. 363, 381-82
(1948). Swisher's remarks occurred in the course of a symposium on "The Writing of
Judicial Biography," in which J. Willard Hurst and Felix Frankfurter also participated (the latter as an absentee). Frankfurter was himself the author of a Supreme
Court biography prior to his appointment. See E FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE
HoLMES AND TrH SUPREME COURT (1938).
6 A. BICKEL, TnE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 31 (1962).
1E Frankfurter, Justice Holmes Defines the Constitution, THE ATLANTIC
MoNTILY,October 1938, reprintedin LAW AND POLrTCS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF
FELix FRANKFURTER, 1913-1938, at 63 (E. Prichard & A. MacLeish eds. 1939)
[hereinafter cited as E. PRICHARD & A. MACLEIsH].
8Farman, The Writing of JudicialBiography-A Symposium, 24 IND. L.J.
363, 368 (1948).
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Even an individual Justice's lone dissent-the essence of a
"solo"- can be appreciated fully by the historian only in the context
of the backstage conferences (to Frankfurter, "rehearsals") out of
which it arose. An honest depiction of any Justice's Supreme Court
life thus requires consideration of the Court as a whole. As a result,
biographies of individual Justices should be evaluated, at least in significant part, in terms of how well they dramatize not only the Justice's moral evolution but also the institution's collective struggle to
define and articulate its proper social, political, and historical role.
This complicated story, when properly told, is necessarily a political as
well as an intellectual one, for the Court as an entity, and each Justice
separately, have been charged with the job of establishing through
decisions in "hard cases" a hierarchy of socially legitimated moral
values. While other biographies tell stories about people, Supreme
Court biographies-even those with no particular philosophical
aspirations-are obligated to tell stories about a profession, an institution, and the development of moral ideas. For the judicial biographer,
moral reasoning, professional craftmanship, the ability to persuade
colleagues, and the simple power to cast one vote out of nine are all
independently historically significant and, at the same time, inextricably linked.
H.N. Hirsch's The Enigma of Felix FrankfurterO and James E
Simon's biography of William 0. Douglas, Independent Journey,'"
represent two distinctly different approaches to the Supreme Court
biographer's task. The first is an original and impressive judicial psychobiography that is selective, argumentative, and critical in
approach. The second, more conventional and modest in its aspirations, is the first comprehensive account of Douglas' life; it is thorough, detached, and generally admiring in tone. In many ways, the
books mirror their respective subjects' intellectual styles. The Frankfurter book, which is clearly intended for a more limited professional
audience than is the Douglas biography, is internally taut, heavily
documented, and explicitly concerned with puzzling out a particular
9 H. HIRsCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981) [hereinafter cited as
H. HIRscH].
,o J. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (1980)

[hereinafter cited as J. SIMON].
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contradiction in the career of a very complex man. Specifically, Hirsch
addresses Frankfurter's apparent conversion following his appointment to the Court from a notorious civil libertarian into a Justice who
was notoriously passive in civil liberties cases. Independent Journey,
on the other hand, is rambling, rhetorical, and loose. It largely skirts
several significant enigmas in Douglas' life, noting but never exploring
apparent inconsistencies in his behavior.
As might be expected, The Enigma'sconcentration on particular
personal details tends to underemphasize the significance of larger historical developments, while Independent Journey,rushing to affirm
Douglas' place in the civil liberties honor roll, neglects to analyze with
any particularity the nature or ultimate value of its subject's historical
contribution. Together, however, the two books demonstrate the uses
and limitations of judicial biography as a genre and help to suggest
how the Justices-and the Court-transmute ideas and experiences
into law.

The broad outlines of the lives of Felix Frankfurter and William
0. Douglas, and the striking differences between their judicial philosophies and personal backgrounds, are familiar to many." Urbane, talkative, and physically diminutive, Frankfurter, a Jewish immigrant
from Vienna, has come to epitomize the well-connected power broker
"Both Frankfurter and Douglas seem to have been exceptionally conscious of
their historical image. Frankfurter carefully cultivated historians and respected jour-

nalists throughout his life, and, in addition to the myriad assessments of him that
have appeared in law reviews, has been the subject of a number of biographical
works. See, e.g., H. THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH (1960);
FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES (H. Phillips ed. 1960); Lash, A Brahmin of the
Law; A BiographicalEssay, in FRoM THE DARsms OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1975).
Douglas, through his memoirs, has thus far directly assumed most of his own historical imagemaking. See W DouGLAs, THE COURT YEARS (1980); W. DOUGLAS, Go
(1974). While Frankfurter has always been exceptionally well
regarded in elite law school circles, Harvard Law Professor Vern Countryman, a former Douglas law clerk, has so far been virtually the sole defender of Douglas' record.
See, e. g., Countryman, Scholarshipand Common Sense, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1407
nn. 1-3 (1980).
EAST, YOUNG MAN
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and academic entrepreneur. Indeed, he virtually invented the latter role
and forged the Cambridge-Washington nexus that was later to become
so significant. In stark contrast, when the raw-boned Presbyterian
Douglas arrived at Columbia Law School in 1922 from his native
Washington, he could not have been more exotic, in the eyes of an
Eastern classmate, if he had been "wearing antlers."' 2 Yet Douglas
quickly made connections. He served on both the Columbia and Yale
law school faculties and, with the help of Joseph P. Kennedy, at the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Douglas' rise was, in fact, even
more rapid than Frankfurter's. When appointed to the Court in 1939,
he was only forty, the second youngest Justice ever. Frankfurter,
appointed earlier the same year, was fifty-seven at the time.
Their personalities were as divergent as their philosophies and
backgrounds. Though both were proud to the point of arrogance and
perceived as brilliant at an early age, Douglas was thought shy by
many who knew him, while others, not inconsistently, described him
as aloof. Frankfurter was exceptionally outgoing, frequently charming, and socially aggressive in the extreme. Yet each man retained a
powerful awareness that his rise to eminence was less than foreordained. They were self-made successes and ever conscious of the fact,
obsessed throughout their careers with the distinction between "insiders" and "outsiders." Frankfurter, according to Hirsch, "was never
able to shake his resentment at the degree to which he was excluded as
a Jew,"' 3 and responded by assiduous social climbing. He was admittedly more demanding of his Jewish students at Harvard, in an effort
" J. SnIfoN, supranote 10,.at 67, quoting Simon Rifkind, who later defended
Douglas in the 1970 impeachment attempt mounted by then-Congressman Gerald R.

Ford.
11H. HmscH, supra note 9, at 98. Why Hirsch apparently thinks Frankfurter
should have shaken this resentment is another question. After graduating first in his
class at Harvard Law School, Frankfurter went from one Wall Street firm to another
with his hat-and an effusive letter of recommendation from the Dean-in his hand,
and after lengthy, humiliating efforts received exactly one job offer. Along the way,
one recruiter gave him the helpful suggestion that he might want to change his name.
Years later, when the well-known humanitarian Eleanor Roosevelt first met him, she
promptly wrote her mother-in-law that he seemed to be "an interesting little man but
very jew." Lash, supra note 11, at 24. Given such experiences, it is hardly surprising
that Frankfurter never forgot, or "got over," his heritage and background. A more
interesting theme, to which Hirsch does considerable justice, is how Frankfurter's

19821

Book Reviews

to toughen them for the professional struggles ahead, and constantly
marvelled in his letters, memoirs, and diaries that the rich and famous
deigned to be his friends. For his part, Douglas readily acknowledged
4
that he had a "residue of resentment of which I never quite got rid,"'
a carryover from his days of childhood poverty and social exclusion.'I
But Douglas' response to his early outsider status was quite different
from Frankfurter's overt social scrambling. While no less ambitious,
Douglas consciously cultivated the image of rebel and outsider even
after he became the long-time poker partner of the President of the
United States. In addition, of course, Douglas was in many ways
much larger than the Court; a "man's man," he travelled constantly
and widely, wrote on global as well as domestic social and political
concerns, and was a passionate lover of nature and the outdoor life.
Frankfurter, although extraordinarily intelligent and experienced in
many fields besides law, always regarded the judiciary and the judicial
process with sacerdotal devotion and respect. While Frankfurter
viewed his appointment to the Court as the culmination of his career,
Douglas, much younger, was not always so certain it would be the pinnacle of his. Yet both men, so different in appearance and demeanor,
shared a very significant status: at different times and at different
points in their careers, each was widely regarded as the leading civil
libertarian-if not radical-in the land.
The growth of Douglas' public reputation as a civil libertarian
following his appointment to the Court coincided with the decline of
Frankfurter's following his appointment. It is this apparently fading
ambivalence toward his Jewishness simultaneously manifested itself in public support
of Zionist causes and a proud association with Louis D. Brandeis, as well as an
unabashed hero worship of such distinctly non-Jewish Establishment figures as
Holmes, Henry Stimson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.
" W.DouGLAs, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN 61(1974).
11J. SimoN, supranote 10, at 30-31. As a teenager, Douglas took ajob for a few
weeks as an informant for a member of Yakima's upright middle class who had
decided it was time to rid the town of its few prostitutes and bootleggers. As Simon
tells it, "His job was to spend Saturday and Sunday nights strolling up and down
South Front Street... inviting solicitations from the pleasure merchants:' J.SIMON,
supra note 10, at 30. Douglas quickly became ashamed of this role and forever
resented the fact that his employer had apparently thought the South Front Street
assignment too demeaning for either of his own two sons, who were the same age as
Douglas.
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commitment to libertarian principles that Hirsch considers Frankfurter's "enigma":
When he was appointed to the Court many expected his
long-time commitment to civil liberties to translate into judicial philosophy; instead Frankfurter demonstrated an austere commitment to judicial self-restraint .... The central

hypothesis of this study is that Frankfurter can only be
understood
politically if we understand him psychologi6
cally,
Like others before him,' 7 Hirsch recounts how Frankfurter had
earned a considerable reputation as a champion of unpopular, even
radical, causes prior to his Court appointment. Following stints as an
Assistant United States Attorney in New York, an aide to Henry
Stimson's 1910 gubernatorial campaign, and the chief legal officer
of the Department of War's Bureau of Insular Affairs (and special
assistant to Secretary of War Stimson during the Taft administration),
Frankfurter became a roving presidential investigator of the labor battles in the West during Woodrow Wilson's presidency. As secretary and
counsel to the President's Mediation Commission, he travelled widely
throughout the West, living for months at a time in a railroad car,
defending the rights of Arizona Wobblies against goons and vigilantes.
In the same capacity, he wrote a highly critical and well-publicized
report to the President on the trial of San Francisco labor organizer
Tom Mooney. Frankfurter was firmly convinced that Mooney's conviction on a bombing charge was the result of perjured testimony. The
response of Frankfurter's former mentor and hero Theodore
Roosevelt was not favorable; he publicly charged that the Commission
was falling under "Bolshevik influences."' 8 Later, defying the old-line
Boston and Harvard establishments, Frankfurter wrote a similar
attack concerning the Sacco and Vanzetti prosecution. 9 He worked
"6H. Hmsc, supranote 9, at 5.
"1See works listed note 11 supra.
"1H. HiRscH, supranote 9, at 56.
" EFRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETrI (1927).
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arduously with the National Consumer's League, the NAACP, and the
ACLU, and, as Brandeis' stand-in, attended the Versailles Peace Conference to promote Zionist causes. While teaching at Harvard, he also
authored numerous liberal editorials- for The New Republic.
Yet, according to Hirsch, all of this activity and accomplishment
contributed to the development of a "textbook case of neurotic personality: someone whose self-image is overblown and yet at the same
time essential to his well-being' 20 Frankfurter, Hirsch argues, experienced an exceptionally prolonged period of uncertainty concerning his
personal and professional identity during early adulthood, provoked
by general feelings of "outsideness:' The massive insecurity caused by
the anti-Semitic reaction to his mentor Louis Brandeis' appointment to
the Court, the death of his father, the difficulties of adjusting to academia after his heady Wilson-era Washington experiences, and his
prospective marriage to a non-Jew-all of which occurred in Frankfurter's early thirties-triggered a grave personal crisis. Frankfurter's
response was to overcompensate in the self-image he eventually developed. After so much insecurity, Hirsch claims, Frankfurter became so
superficially secure, particularly in regard to his own intelligence and
expertise, that he could no longer truly comprehend that reasonable
people might differ. Instead, throughout his adult life, Frankfurter
projected his self-doubt onto others and assumed that anyone opposing him was either less intelligent, less honest, or less disinterested than
he. The result, as Frankfurter grew increasingly isolated on the activist
Warren Court, was "an obsessive concern with the motives of his judicial opponents mixed with high-pitched anger at their behavior and
doctrines!'"' Having begun as an insecure outsider, he became an arrogantly secure one by the end.
Hirsch attempts to prove his case through an interpretation of
Frankfurter's diaries and letters, many of which have previously been
published. His tools are political scientist James David Barber's concept of "political style"2 and the neo-Freudianism of Erik Erikson
20

H.

21

Id.

HiRsCH,

supra note 9, at 5.

22

J.

BARBER,

THE

PREsIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN

THE Wmm HousE (1972). Barber's views have received considerable publicity over
the years on newspaper op-ed pages and in weekly newsmagazines.
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and Karen Horney, from whom he borrows, respectively, the concepts
of "identity" 3 and "self-image." 2 ' For Hirsch's purposes, "an individual's style involves his manner of handling the three things that appear
in any political role-words, work, and people. ''2 Hirsch claims that
Frankfurter's "self-image" depended heavily on his exaggerated esti''2 6
mate of his talent for what Frankfurter himself called "personalia,

the ability to achieve his goals through a "political style" based primar' This style was plainly the key to Frankfurtily on "handling people " 27
er's greatest pre-Court success as a behind-the-scenes operative and
idea man for President Franklin Roosevelt. But, says Hirsch, while
this style had served Frankfurter handily as a troubleshooting professorial free-lancer, it was a style ill-suited to the Supreme Court. The
result was a serious "misfit" 2 between his domineering and manipulative personality and his ostensibly collegial judicial role. On the Court,
Frankfurter was simply "one man among nine, ' 29 and he could not

effectively control his unaccountable, independent peers.
23 E. ERIKSON,

GANmm's TRUTH (1969); E.

ERIKSON, YOUNG MAN LUTHER

(1958); E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY (1950).
24 K. HORNEY, NEUROSIS AND HUMAN GROWTH (1950).
" H. HRscH, supra note 9, at 6.
6
Id. at 62.
" Frankfurter used this personalized political style to considerable advantage in
one instance that raises a serious ethical question. As new lead counsel in an upcoming landmark case, Frankfurter personally approached Chief Justice White in chambers in regard to changing the Court's previous decision not to hear oral argument
but merely to decide the case on the briefs. He told White, known to be a devout
Catholic, that he knew this ex parte approach might be ethically questionable, but
asked that the Chief consider him a penitent entering "the confessional!' Frankfurter
later bragged about the success of this "master stroke." H. HIRScH, supranote 9, at
46. Interestingly, the only genuinely scandalous revelation in The Brethren concerns
the attempt of one of Frankfurter's most prominent New Deal disciples, Thomas G.
Corcoran, to use his personal contacts as a means of "lobbying" Justices Black and
Brennan into granting a petition for rehearing in the El PasoNaturalGas case, Utah
Pub, Serv. Comm'n v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 395 U.S. 464 (1969). B.
WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, supra note 3, at 79-81.
" H. HmscH, supra note 9, at 7.
29 "One Man Among Nine" is the well-chosen title of Hirsch's introductory
chapter. A particularly regrettable consequence of Hirsch's purposeful selectivity is
that, in addition to occasionally leaving the reader at sea with respect to developments occurring beyond Frankfurter's immediate range of vision, see text accompany
note 35 infra, The Enigma'sstrictly psychobiographical format does not give Hirsch
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Out of frustration, Hirsch argues, Frankfurter began to harden
certain of his preappointment stands and to emphasize precisely those
strands of his emerging judicial philosophy that his colleagues most
sharply rejected. Specifically, because Frankfurter could not control
the Court's outcomes, he increasingly questioned the Court's competence to make society's value choices. Frankfurter argued instead that
choosing among competing values was a distinctly legislative function,
even though this position meant abandoning to some extent his past
activism in behalf of civil liberties. In short, says Hirsch, because
Frankfurter's psychologically essential efforts to manipulate and control were systematically frustrated on the Court, and his views were
accorded less deference there than at Harvard and in Franklin
Roosevelt's White House, Frankfurter argued with increasing vehemence that the Court should not do much at all.
Hirsch's psychological inquiry begins with a sensible disclaimer:

his book "is not an attempt to reduce [Frankfurter's] jurisprudence to

the content of his psyche' 3 Hirsch also acknowledges that personality
"seldom" supplants an individual's political ideology, even though the

selection of an ideology may itselfbe "strongly influenced by personal-

ity factors" 3' Although most of the book is similarly cautious and cir-

cumspect in its analytical claims, Hirsch's conclusions, as set forth in
his closing chapter, are surprisingly wooden and oddly diagnostic in

tone.
an opportunity to elaborate systematically his ideas regarding the functions and operations of the Court. On the occasions when he does address such subjects, Hirsch
appears to have sound intuitions and insightful analyses. See text accompanying
notes 91-99 infra.
30 H. HmscH, supranote 9, at 9.
3,Id. at 210. More specifically, Hirsch suggests that 'ideology' will often
explain the general direction of a subject's behavior; 'personality' may then explain
the precise route, speed, and means of reaching his destination." Id. at 9. While
Hirsch has been faulted for paying insufficient attention to psychobiography's potential to become a "venomous enterprise," Stone, Book Review, 95 HARv. L. REV.
346, 348 (1981), as a rough guide to the difference between intellectually controllable
"ideology" and uncontrollable "personality," Hirsch's explanation in fact seems reasonable and inoffensive. If anything, it is precisely the opposite of psychological
reductionism. In fact, Stone's attack on Hirsch itself constitutes a surprisingly
defensive-and therefore revealing-demonstration of Frankfurter's continued sway
in certain legal academic circles.
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Concerned with establishing "the presence of so many similarities
between Frankfurter's behavior and Horney's general neurotic personality and the specific style of the narcissistic personality, 3' 2 Hirsch suggests in his closing chapter that this disorder created in Frankfurter a
state of mind, rooted in "basic anxiety,"33 which shifted Frankfurter's
jurisprudence away from a concern with fundamental substantive values and toward an obsession with appearing to be disinterested and
self-restrained. Frankfurter's belief in his own "specialness" was based
on his obvious brilliance and his considerable ability to manipulate
other people, which in turn were based on and manifested through
perpetual, if largely unconscious, sycophancy toward anyone who
could further his career or ideas. Hirsch also suggests that Frankfurter's disinclination to resume formal government responsibility once he
left the Wilson administration for Harvard, together with his preference for operating as a Washington gadfly while retaining his
none-too-demanding Harvard Law School chair, nurtured, and were
required by, this same narcissism."' Because he was for so long free to
pick and choose his political battles, as well as the targets for his
charm, Frankfurter could guarantee himself repeated, psychologically
important "victories" and thereby continually reconfirm his egocentric vision of the world.
Remarkably, considering the amount of effort The Enigma
expends in explicating and applying Hirsch's psychobiographical theories, not very much depends on agreeing with or even understanding
them. "Style," "identity," and "self-image" have long since ceased to
be esoteric technical terms. Moreover, Hirsch's own application of
them, aside from his belabored opening and closing chapters, is itself
generally nontechnical, and his argument concerning the roots of
Frankfurter's behavior is strengthened, not weakened, by its heavy
measure of common sense. However, despite the specific disclaimers
Hirsch carefully intersperses throughout the text to avoid the charge of
psychological reductionism, the assessment of Frankfurter that ultimately emerges underemphasizes his special talents and tends, however unintentionally, to diminish them. More importantly, his heavily
" H. HUIscH, supra note 9, at 203-04.

"Id. at 207.
34 Id.
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clinical emphasis, which would be entirely appropriate if his objective
were to formulate a treatment plan, does not significantly advance historical analysis.
The Enigma's account of Frankfurter's life, although ultimately
quite complete, requires very careful reading. It is resolutely elliptical
and episodic, referring to events in the outside world only in terms of
their relevance to Frankfurter's personality development. Hirsch's circuitous exposition of the basic facts of Frankfurter's life presumes a
fairly specific familiarity with Frankfurter's career on the part of the
reader, and, while Hirsch says all the right words (that Frankfurter was
brilliant, charming, energetic, and so forth), his tendency to focus on
personality traits in isolation from Frankfurter's historical context
tends to distort and magnify their historical importance. Frankfurter
may have been just as manipulative, domineering, and bitter as Hirsch
suggests, but it is still important to remember that he was displaying
these traits at the grandest possible level: interacting with the President, the Congress, and his colleagues on the Court. If Frankfurter's
"basic anxiety" explains his "high-pitched anger," it does not necessarily follow that the existence of this anger is significant, or even interesting, except insofar as it affected his effectiveness or views. Indeed,
even from the point of view of social, as opposed to legal, history, the
important question about Frankfurter's character is not whether he
was neurotic but whether anyone who experienced his mercurial rise
up the social ladder could avoidbeing neurotic.
Although Hirsch has been accused of hostility toward meritocratic values,3" the more apt charge may be that his view of the meritocracy is too pristine. It would seem highly improbable that a Viennese immigrant, unschooled in the English language until in his teens,
could possibly have become a presidential advisor, a confidante of the
two most famous Supreme Court Justices of this century, an eminent
professor, and an exceptionally influential Supreme Court Justice
without along the way developing, or taking advantage of, some
unusual personality traits. A careful reading of The Enigma makes
clear that Hirsch in fact does appreciate Frankfurter's achievements,
but his highly selective and argumentative style and excessively clinical
approach often make The Enigmaread like an indictment rather than
11Stone, supranote 31, at 346.
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a disinterested analysis. Moreover, as will be discussed, Hirsch's reliance on Frankfurter's private papers and his narrow focus on Frankfurter's personal life may also have caused him to err seriously with
respect to the evolution of his subject's judicial philosophy.
Still, none of this in any way detracts from the detailed and convincing portrait of Frankfurter's psyche that The Enigma draws. And
that psyche is in several major respects simply astonishing, particularly
with respect to the complete disjunction Hirsch establishes between
Frankfurter's perception of his opponents' behavior and his perception of his own. As Hirsch makes clear, Frankfurter regularly projected his own worst faults onto his judicial colleagues. For example,
he was highly critical of the other Justices' (primarily Douglas') allegedly excessive involvement in extrajudicial political matters, while he
himself never ceased to provide counsel to ED.R.36 Similarly, Frankfurter could actually assert with a straight face that capital punishment
should be accorded "the fawners and flatterers of those in power,"37
while he prospered as a power broker throughout his life precisely by
massaging important egos. His "love letters"3 to the likes of Brandeis
and Oliver Wendell Holmes exemplify this obsequiousness. Indeed, the
extravagance of Frankfurter's flattery (which no doubt was in part an
immigrant's sincere hero worship of democracy's-and meritocracy's-leaders) can hardly be described; the extraordinary flavor of
his letters to Holmes can be captured only by the reading:
To know you is to have life authenticated not through you
but in my own rich increase of life. The abundant measure
of life being at once proof of its worth, I count it as one of
my ultimately precious benedictions to have you to be-for
so I feel-be part of me.
When I saw you from the very first I knew it was there-the
answer to life that needeth no "answer," that accepts without
fatalism, that questions without humorous arrogance.
16For evidence of Frankfurter's ongoing role as an all-purpose Roosevelt advisor after his appointment to the Court, see Lash, supra note 11, at 74.
" H. HmsCH, supra note 9, at 208.
"Id. at 87.
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Above all there is the beauty and the gay valor of you, for
me forever. You give me the exhilaration, the life-intoxicated
ferment that no other man does-and with you I feel the
overtones and undertones which need no speech and have
none.39
Thus, while the usefulness of Hirsch's overly diagnostic orientation is questionable and his theoretical analysis seems oddly superimposed, if neurosis frequently "manifests itself in the often startling gap
between what the neurotic does and what he says he does,""0 there can
be little doubt that Hirsch's diagnosis is correct. In the many contradictions Frankfurter displayed, it is at least clear that he was not being
hypocritical in any normal sense. Rather, brilliant as he was, he was
also seriously self-deluded.

II
The judicial career of William 0. Douglas, as portrayed in James
Simon's exceptionally well-written and more traditional biography,
presents an enigma of its own. Douglas' libertarian judicial rulings
were not inconsistent with any previously developed judicial philosophy; rather, the enigma is whether he had any recognizable judicial
philosophy at all. For Douglas, a liberal uniquely unaffected by the
implications ofLochnerv. New York,4 or perhaps uniquely impressed
among Supreme Court Justices by the reductionist versions of legal
realism circulating among the Columbia and Yale Law School faculties
in the twenties and thirties, personal philosophy and jurisprudence
were essentially one and the same. No particular intellectual effort was
required to translate one into the other.
Independent Journey focuses more widely than does Hirsch's
The Enigma.It explores Douglas' judicial career within the context of
his life rather than seeking to settle any scholarly controversies about
39

Id.

40

Id. at 207.

4' 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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his performance as a Justice. Throughout this comprehensive reconstructive effort, based on numerous interviews (including an amusing
one with Douglas that serves as the book's foreword), as well as
published and private sources, Simon's attitude toward his subject is
admiring yet temperate. However, although IndependentJourneyis by
no means uncritical of Douglas, it fails to articulate any particular critical perspective. As a result, many of Simon's fine insights remain disparate and merely ironical rather than coherent and analytically compelling. In addition, it is difficult to ascertain what Simon considers to
be Douglas' major and minor faults. With respect to Douglas' judicial
career, this failure to analyze may not present an enormous loss;
Douglas' opinions are nothing if not accessible. And simply collecting
and verifying all the details of his life should serve a useful function for
future analytically-minded biographers. Still, even if it is a bit unfair to
criticize Independent Journey for failing to carry analytical weight it
was never intended to bear, Simon's detachment is frequently distressing. His failure to comment, for example, on such remarkable observations as the fact that Douglas, as a Justice, "did not feel bound by
history or judicial precedent ' 42 makes one wonder how Simon perceives the judicial role.
Simon's compilation of basic factual material is perhaps most
valuable as an antidote to Douglas' autobiographies. Simon notes the
Justice's tendency to exaggerate his exploits, invent the too-perfect
anecdote, and relate different versions of the same story to different
audiences. However, while noting the possibility that Douglas' memoirs may overstate the extent of social stratification in his hometown,43
Simon generally accepts Douglas' version of his early life, including
Douglas' assertion that the obscurity of his social origins, coupled with
other childhood experiences, largely shaped his adult personality."' If
as Hirsch argues, Frankfurter's character was deeply affected by a crisis of self-confidence during early adulthood, Douglas' was at least as
deeply scarred by a sickly, lonely, and impoverished childhood.
' J. SIMON, supra note 10, at 251.
"Id. at 30-31.
41 The demonstrated importance of early childhood to Douglas' subsequent
development implicitly calls into question the validity of Hirsch's entire psychobiographical effort, which focuses only on Frankfurter's post-adolescent experiences.
There simply are no records on Frankfurter's life before he came to America at the
age of twelve.
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Douglas grew up fatherless '5 and poor in Yakima, Washington.
As a youth, he bore the brunt of a small town's snobbery, and, in addition, was afflicted with infantile paralysis and other childhood ailments. His mother nicknamed him her "Treasure" and spent hour
upon hour massaging his weakened limbs, justifying her tireless devotion by telling Douglas' neglected siblings that "Treasure" would not
"live past twelve. ' " When "Treasure" in fact recovered, he developed
not only a strong sense of his own self-worth, but also a deep devotion
to the "vigorous life" of the outdoors.
During adolescence, Douglas' early encounter with social rejection developed into a passionate, almost blind hostility toward what he

vaguely labelled the "Establishment," a phrase that recurs in his memoirs with truly obsessive frequency to describe anything smacking of
the hypocritical self-righteousness and rigid conformity of provincial

life. Academic brilliance and its concomitant accolades and social
acceptance did nothing to abate this hostility in high school or college.

He set out for law school in the East with the chip on his shoulder
firmly in place.

Simon's remarks on Douglas' days as a law student at Columbia,

7

his experience as a litigator for the Cravath firm, his scholarly

11 Douglas' fatherless youth suggests another theme The Enigma might have
profitably explored with respect to Frankfurter. As Hirsch notes, Frankfurter felt
that "the greatest debt I owe my parents is that they left me alone almost completely.'
H. HiRscH, supra note 9, at 16. Hirsch might have observed further that Frankfurter's rapid ascension through the American social structure left him without a
father who could play a meaningful paternal role. He was so quickly integrated into
American culture and so quickly and securely installed in its most elite circles that his
father, a frail, happy man who sold linens door-to-door, ceased to be a viable source
of relevant "fatherly" advice. Thus, Frankfurter's constant search for mentors older
than himself-Stimson, Brandeis, Holmes, and others-may at least in part have
been a reaction to the same sense of fatherlessness that produced Douglas' fierce individualism and, no doubt, latent insecurity. It can hardly be an accident that Frankfurter expressed his appreciation for Harvard in terms of the liberation it represented
from the burden imposed by his "fatherand his face.' H. HmscH, supranote 9, at 21
(emphasis added).
16 J. SIMON, supranote 10, at 38. In career terms at least, Douglas' siblings did
not seem to suffer too much as a result of this early neglect. His brother ultimately
became general counsel to the Statler Hotel chain, and his sister was a
department-store executive.
,' While in law school, Douglas ran a tutoring service, which, he boasted,
"never failed to get a [rich] dumb student into Princeton?' J. SIMON, supranote 10, at
71.
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output on the law school faculties at Columbia and Yale, and his stellar career at the brand-new SEC make clear that the "result" orientation of Douglas' Supreme Court opinions was of a piece with the rest
of his life. Douglas came to view his life early on as a struggle to get
ahead by way of sheer determination and individual effort, whatever
the adversities cast in his way. Get ahead he did, but only by treating
the people, and the institutions, around him as though they too were
"obstacles" or at best (if wives or law clerks) nonentities. If Frankfurter's success was based on his gift at "personalia," Douglas' success can
be traced to a corresponding gift for depersonalizing his world.
Simon's lengthy description of a research project Douglas undertook while a professor at Yale aptly illustrates Douglas' finesse at
depersonalization and his passion for results. Beginning in October of
1929, and continuing for nine months, Douglas commuted every
Monday from New Haven to the bankruptcy court in Newark, New
Jersey in order to study the operation of the bankruptcy laws. Douglas
and his sociologist coauthor studied individual debtors in court and, in
lengthy interviews, probed every detail about the owners of the failed
businesses. Without asking the debtor's permission, Douglas interviewed the bankrupt's creditors, accountants, and employees, and,
according to Simon, also attempted to secure confidential exchanges
between the debtor and social service agencies, or even physicians,
who had aided the debtor or his family. In all of this, Simon dryly
observes, it "did not seem to occur to Douglas that there were values at
stake that might have transcended the practical problems of a
researcher.... The man who later wrote of every citizen's right to privacy did not seem to care.. .. ," In fact, Simon notes, Douglas regretted the inhibiting effect on his bankrupt interviewees of the presence of
counsel. Like many a policeman since Miranda, the William 0.
Douglas of 1929 did not consider the presence of lawyers "conducive
to objective fact gathering."' 9
While Simon is quick to fix on such illustrative inconsistencies in
Douglas' behavior (and to note that the only senator to vote against
his confirmation did so on the ground that the SEC Chairman
appeared insufficiently committed to civil rights and civil liberties),
'Id. at 112.
4' Id. at 113.

1982]

Book Reviews

Simon fails to offer any explanation or press these inconsistencies
toward some resolution. His silence leaves Douglas, whom he clearly
respects and admires, vulnerable to two familiar charges, neither very
flattering: that he merely preened for the liberal press, grandstanding
every case either with or without the hope of someday becoming President; or that his judicial output reflected an arbitrary and analytically
unsophisticated preference for the "little guy' Because Simon makes
no effort to probe Douglas' contradictions, he indirectly confirms the
widespread impression of Douglas as an egotistical maverick, a particular kind of natural genius who never learned, adapted, or grew. Ironically, while Hirsch's narrowly focused psychobiography has a distinctly distorting effect on Frankfurter's achievement, even Hirsch
does not leave his subject open to such a simplistic charge.
Simon does at least make clear that Douglas' rejection of the conventional judicial role was a conscious choice. Early in his Court
career he developed a conception of his. role as that of a "national
teacher," addressing himself to a lay rather than professional audience,
with the aim of educating "the conscience of our people."5 His indifference to the profession's reception of his work apparently extended
to his colleagues on the Court as well; a "maverick streak," says
Simon, led Douglas to write "exclusively for himself," 5' generally not
caring whether anyone else joined with him. Although he does not
quite say so, Simon suggests in several places that a desire to curry
immediate political favor may indeed have motivated Douglas on a
number of significant occasions, particularly when he granted a
last-minute single-Justice stay of the Rosenberg execution on
uncharacteristically technical grounds after voting on several previous
occasions to deny a review on the merits.
SOId. at

341. Interestingly, Frankfurter's former law clerk and prot~g6, Alexander Bickel, also noted and endorsed the Court's "educational function" A. BICKEL,
Tim LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 26 (1962). Cf.Rostow, The DemocraticCharacter
ofJudicialReview, 66 HARv. L. REv. 193, 208 (1952) (The Justices "are inevitably

teachers in a vital national seminar").
"' J. SIMON, supranote 10, at 353. It should be noted that Frankfurter, for one,
strongly disagreed with this view of Douglas. He believed Douglas to be "shameless"

in his attempts to garner the other Justices' votes. H. HiRsCH, supra note 9, at
164-67.
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Yet Simon also takes pains to demonstrate that the libertarian
judicial outlook and free-flowing literary style that Douglas developed
as a Justice were entirely consistent with his personality and background. Consistently favoring David over Goliath, Douglas cast aside
technical legal barriers to reach what he viewed as just results. His
judicial opinions were, in Simon's words, "characterized by direct,
incisive forays" 2 rather than prolonged technical explication:
Douglas was not writing for the HarvardLaw Review, but
perhaps it was important that he did not. For if he had
played the scholarly game, delivering long, heavily documented treatises dwelling on technical aspects of the law, he
might not have reached the substantive issues that would be
crucial to future generations of Americans. 3
Simon's conclusion is that Douglas "was not a lawyer's judge or a
judge's judge or a scholar's judge. He was a people's judge, promoting
his strong egalitarian philosophy regardless of whether or not his views
were well supported by precedent."5 ' Damning the technicalities, he
plunged straight ahead.
Simon apparently believes that it was sufficient for Douglas
merely to articulate general principles, leaving the development of logical and doctrinal details to less visionary Justices or, to be historically
precise, to his long-time colleague Hugo Black. However, Simon fails
to note the disastrous effect of this frontier jurisprudence. To a considerable extent, Douglas' understandable impatience with the trivia and
tedium of workaday legal "craft" simply removed the man's lifework
from the common universe of legal discourse, and provided valuable
ammunition to those hostile to his substantive views. Moreover, Simon
acknowledges that his subject's failure to concentrate on detail harmed
even some of Douglas' least technical and most visionary expositions
of general principles. According to Simon, Douglas' energetic declaration of the fundamental right to privacy in Griswoldv. Connecticut,"
which he describes as "one of the most important constitutional deciJ,SiMoN, supranote 10, at 250.
J.
"Id. at 256.
' Id. at 354.
s 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

1982]

Book Reviews

sions of the century,"56 was not written with the eloquence Douglas
had displayed on the subject on other occasions. The result of such a
ruggedly individualistic (and at times overtly self-indulgent) approach
to jurisprudence, unconcerned with following or creating precedent,
was a legacy of wonderful quotations and remarkably little else to
build on."
Simon ultimately perceives Douglas as "a heroic symbol of the
human spirit, offering an unwavering belief that the power and dignity
of the individual could make the nation and the world a better
' This conclusion, regrettably, is not as helpful as a cool assessplace " 58
ment of his judicial impact would be. Many of us share Douglas'
"belief"; very few of us get to be Supreme Court Justices. While there
are constitutional scholars who seriously contend that the Supreme
Court's function is primarily "prophetic," 59 such a view does not
excuse the Justices-be they "heroic symbols" or otherwise-from
deciding actual cases in a manner calculated to be useful as well as stirring. Moreover, it is an essential part of their job that they do so with
sufficient professional self-discipline to gain the thoughtful attention,
rather than disregard, of their successor Justices.
III
Despite the sharp differences between Hirsch's intentional, argumentative selectivity and Simon's detached comprehensiveness, their
biographies share a tendency to slight the intellectual dimension of
their subjects and, especially in Hirsch's case, their political ideologies.
Interestingly, they do so in almost exactly opposite ways. Hirsch overanalyzes Frankfurter's internal life, tending, despite the best of intentions, to understate the independent importance of Frankfurter's ideas
to him as ideas. Simon, by insufficiently probing the psychological
bases of Douglas' seemingly compulsive iconoclasm and failing to link
it to the intellectual and institutional traditions within which Douglas
"J. SIMON, supranote 10, at 348.
, See Dworkin, Dissenton Douglas,28 N.Y. REv. BooKs 3 (1981).
j. SIMON, supranote 10, at 454.
J8
19 See, e.g., Perry, NoninterpretiveReview in Human Rights Cases: A FunctionalJustification, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 291 (1981).
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operated, inadvertently trivializes the very gestures and stances Simon
himself finds so noble.
In particular, by failing to prompt in the reader an appreciation
of Douglas' motives and the dynamics of his inner life-by merely
reporting his apparently changing attitude toward civil liberties without accounting for it-Simon creates a figure whose inner workings
are ultimately inaccessible to us. As depicted by Simon, Douglas is an
uncompromising lone wolf who inexplicably managed to net one of
Washington's biggest political prizes, and at the virtually unprecedented age of forty. The same failure to account creates additional
problems when it comes to Douglas' off-the-bench activities, which so
enraged Frankfurter. Because Simon largely ignores the persistent
charge that Douglas' career was based on a desire to look good in the
press for his own political ends, it is difficult to discern from Independent Journey why Douglas was so sought after by the politically
knowledgeable. Franklin Roosevelt seems to have wanted Douglas as
his 1944 running mate, and, by Douglas' own account, he was actually
offered the Democratic vice-presidential nomination in 1948.60
Simon's reticence, of course, may simply be attributable to the
general nonreflectiveness of his subject. If Douglas really did not think
too much, if his "directness" resulted from a failure to criticize his own
assumptions, then the fact that Independent Journey portrays an
insensitive egotist is not due to Simon's shortcomings as a biographer.
Yet some of Douglas' opinions, particularly those that reflect a struggle of deeply held values, such as his majority opinion in Village of
Belle Terre v. Borass' or his far sighted dissent in DeFunisv. Odegaard,2 indicate that he was not a one-dimensional thinker. Indeed,
60 W. DOUGLAS, Tim CoUrT YEARS 289 (1980). If a self-confident, globetrotting

internationalist like Douglas had succeeded Franklin Roosevelt, history might have
been rewritten. It seems certain that it would have been much harder to convince this
new President of the wisdom of dropping the atomic bomb on Japan. But see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), where Douglas voted to uphold curfews and exclusion orders applicable only to Japanese Americans on grounds of wartime necessity.
61416 U.S. 1 (1974).
62 416 U.S. 312 (1974)(per curiam). DeFuniswas dismissed by the majority in a
per curiam opinion on the ground of mootness. While other Justices dissented on the

question of mootness, Douglas went further and addressed the thorny issue of the
relationship between racial equality and social justice.
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Simon himself turns up scattered evidence suggesting that Independent
Journey's portrait of an aggressive and outspoken individualist could
have been developed with more subtlety. As a law professor at Yale,
for example, Douglas was apparently a master at self-advancement
through faculty politics, frequently demonstrating the ability to keep
quiet when tactful silence was more profitable than open disagreement. Thus, his "direct incisive forays" on the Court appear to be a
chosen mode of operation, perhaps as calculated as his earlier shows
of deference. Even if the latter were mere aberrations, Simon still may
owe us the duty of saying so, of at least addressing the question of
whether Douglas' judicial career makes sense. The claim that Douglas
represents a "heroic symbol of the human spirit" sounds like very faint
praise if we are not also told what difference this man's long judicial
career made.
Ironically, Hirsch's effort to solve Frankfurter's "enigma" also
falters, not for want of an analytical theory or because of any defect in
the theory he has chosen, but because he applies his theory to an
improperly phrased question. As already noted, Hirsch's inquiry is
directed to the "puzzle" presented by the fact that Frankfurter did not
become a leading judicial exponent of civil liberties when those familiar with his preappointment career "expected" him to be. However, in
solving that puzzle, it is not sufficient to examine why Frankfurter
seemed to change after donning his robe; it is equally important to ask
whether contemporary expectations of him were justified in the first
place.
Joseph Lash,63 Sanford Levinson,"' and others tend to support
the notion that the onlookers' expectations had been based on a shaky
foundation all along. First, as Anthony Lewis has suggested, 65 "there
may have been something about the immigrant experience" that made
Frankfurter look upon representative "democracy" with a special reverence, a reverence strengthened by his own rise to power and influence through intelligence and hard work (his flattery being unconscious and unacknowledged) despite, as he put it, his "father and his
63 Lash,

supranote 11.
The DemocraticFaith of Felix Frankfurter,25 STAN. L. REv.431

64 Levinson,

(1973).

65 Lewis,

ProcessandPrinciple,N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1974, at 33, col. 1.Lewis'

remarks were made in the context of a column memorializing Alexander Bickel, also
an immigrant from eastern Europe.
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face."66 Indeed, Levinson has suggested that patriotism, never the first
refuge of the libertarian, played the central defining role in Frankfurter's life that religion plays in many others'. 7
Probably more significant in shaping Frankfurter's ultimate
judicial outlook are two other factors that Hirsch mentions only in
passing, or in a psychoanalytic rather than historical context:6 s
Frankfurter's direct experience with the Supreme Court before he was
appointed, and the specific nature of his preappointment commitment
to the cause of civil liberties. A striking and consistent theme runs
through Frankfurter's three best-known civil liberties positions-his
labor investigations, the Mooney case, and the Sacco and Vanzetti
trial. On each occasion, he said either that the judiciary had become
politicized and overstepped its proper bounds, or that the courts had
failed in their special duty to accord litigants the essential modicum of
procedural fairness that it was their special duty to ensure. In two out
of these three cases, moreover, he was insulated to some extent from
self-doubt (if not criticism) by the fact that he was supposedto be fulfilling a partisan, investigatory role. The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti,69
like Frankfurter's report in the Mooney case, argued simply that the
0 was
judicial process had been abused, and The Labor Injunction"
written, after all, precisely to oppose excessive judicial activism.
While Hirsch does an admirable job of probing the latent contradictions in Frankfurter's pre-Court commitment to civil liberties, noting that many of his notions were internally inconsistent as well as
"fuzzy, inarticulate, and unrefined,"' he does not take the next analytical step. There is substantial reason to believe that Frankfurter's
66 H.

HIRSCH, supra note 9, at 21.
Levinson, supra note 64.
"H. HIRSCH, supranote 9, at 54-57.
69 E FRANKFURTER, Supra note 19.
70 E FRANKFURTER, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
71H. HIRSCH, supranote 9, at 133: Elsewhere, Hirsch specifically notes that the
Mooney case gained Frankfurter "a reputation for radicalism in these cases that he
never quite shook off. It was a completely undeserved label; Frankfurter was...
concerned with due process of law rather than the specific merits of the IWW or Tom
Mooney's politics." Id. at 57. Thus, the problem with Hirsch's analysis is not a failureto note the limits of Frankfurter's personal "radicalism" but to appreciate sufficiently
the degree to which Frankfurter had always thought in terms of relative institutional
.competence.
67
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pre- and post-appointment behavior with regard to civil liberties may
not have been seriously inconsistent at all, even though such an inconsistency may later have been widely perceived.
Moreover, the question of Frankfurter's "inconsistency" seems
particularly ill-phrased when his judicial tendency to defer to legislative directives is viewed in light of the fact that, throughout most of his
career and continuing virtually up to his appointment, the Supreme
Court was an extraordinarily reactionary institution In 1923, in
Adkins v. Children's Hospital,72 Frankfurter filed a one thousand
page "Brandeis brief" to the Supreme Court in defense of a District of
Columbia law that established a minimum wage for women. In the
brief, he described just how hard one had to work to make a living
under then-prevailing wages and the toll such labor exacted in terms of
health and family. A year later, after losing the case, he bitterly concluded in The New Republic that "[w]e have had fifty years of experiment with the Fourteenth Amendment, and the centralizing authority
lodged with the Supreme Court over the domestic affairs of
forty-eight widely different states is an authority it simply cannot discharge with safety either to itself or to the states. The due process
clauses ought to go....,73 He claimed that it was "highly significant
that not a single constitution framed for English-speaking countries
since the Fourteenth Amendment has embodied the [due process
clause's] provisions. And one would indeed be lacking in a sense of
humor to suggest that life, liberty, and property"' 74 are not amply protected in such countries." There is little superficial inconsistency at
least in his 1924 suggestion that "by eliminating this class of cases the
Supreme Court would really be relieved of a contentiously political
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
Frankfurter, The Red TerrorofJudicialReform, 40 THE NEw REPUBLic 110,
113 (1924), reprinted in E. PRicHAD & A. MAcLEISH, supra note 7, at 10, 16
(emphasis added).
72

74Id.

75In hindsight, it is interesting to note that South Africa was included in the list
of English-speaking countries where Frankfurter's "sense of humor" told him that
civil liberties happily survived without a due process clause. Id. It would be foolish to
suggest, of course, that the existence of a due process clause, in the absence of a serious societal commitment to civil rights and liberties, would have made any difference
in that country's history. What is interesting, and rather out of character, see note 89
infra,is that Frankfurter, caught up in his disgust with the Adkins Court, overlooked
the conditions under which most South Africans lived.
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burden, '7 6 and his arguments twenty and thirty years later that, as
long as they were still around, the clauses should only be read to incorporate "those canons of decency and fairness which express those
'7
notions of justice of English speaking peoples."
Naturally enough, this antagonism toward activist judicial review
of legislative enactments only intensified during the New Deal years
when review of national, as opposed to state, legislation came to the
fore. Although Frankfurter's refusal to comment publicly on Franklin
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan may be attributable to his own judicial
aspirations, the fact remains that he did not comment, and annoyance
may at least have complemented ambition as a motive for silence.
Indeed, when Eleanor Roosevelt later criticized Frankfurter for
upholding a law she thought was anti-civil libertarian, Frankfurter
replied that he was merely continuing the position he had asserted in
defense of her husband's legislative program. 7 As he had written
almost a decade earlier in the Yale Review, experience had led him to
conclude, as a matter of principle, that the Court sorely needed "the
humility not to set up its own judgment against the conscientious
Id.
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 400, 416-17 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Such a standard was so
imprecise, of course, that even the "restrained" and "disinterested" Frankfurter
could not apply it with any meaningful consistency. Thus, the ultimate irony is that
Frankfurter adopted an entirely subjective-"shocking the conscience"-standard
for constitutional review (and, in particular, for the selective "incorporation" of the
Bill of Rights via the fourteenth amendment) while his allegedly less-disinterested
brethren, such as Hugo Black, at least attempted to anchor their views in the Constitution's text. Moreover, as Hirsch ably demonstrates, despite Frankfurter's rhetoric,
he was not above reading his own values into the Constitution from time to time.
H. HIRSCH, supra note 9, at 191-97. Occasionally, he even articulated a point of view
with respect to certain basic rights, e.g., free debate, privacy, and a reasonably democratic process that sounded suspiciously like a "preferred position" analysis, even
though Frankfurter of course shied away from using quite those words. See, e.g.,
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police ... is basic to a free society"); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("those liberties of the individual
which history has attested as the indispensable conditions of an open as opposed to
closed society come to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal
is made to liberties which derive from shifting economic arrangements").
7 See Lash, supranote 11, at 70.
76

17
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efforts of those whose primary duty is to govern."" It is hardly surprising, therefore, that once appointed he did what he had always said
should be done.
A "role theorist" before the term was coined, Frankfurter once
advised fellow Justice Frank Murphy, "[Y]our biographers will have to
face the question: which is the more courageous character-a sensitive
humanitarian who has taken the oath as a judge, with the resulting
confined freedom of a judge to give expression to his own compassion, or the same person who thinks his compassion is the measure of
the law?"80 One may agree or disagree with Frankfurter's narrow conception of the proper judicial role, and he may surely be faulted for
failing to develop a jurisprudence that systematically distinguished
between legislation bearing on economic regulation and basic civil liberties, but there is little in Frankfurter's carefully articulated positions
on both civil liberties and judicial review prior to his Court appointment to justify a charge of inconsistency or require a diagnosis of
"narcissistic personality" Neurosis may account for his success during
most of his career, for his strained interpersonal relations on the
Court, and for his personal bitterness and frustration. But, while
Hirsch's book is excellent as far as it goes, simply pigeonholing Frankfurter's personality without placing it in any historical or intellectual
context does not add much to our understanding of the origins of his
judicial philosophy or of the reasons for his profound jurisprudential
impact, both of which are grounded in a generation of shared experience, not in individual disorder.
IV
Part of the disappointment engendered by Simon's conclusion
that Douglas presents a "heroic symbol" of the individual's importance comes from the fact that he is saying something every interested
reader of biography already knows and accepts. If the individual life is
not worth knowing, the genre simply has no point. Imbued with typical romantic enthusiasm for inspired genius, Ralph Waldo Emerson
" Frankfurter, Social Issues Before the Supreme Court, YALE REv., Spring
1933, reprintedin E. P icHARD & A. MAcLEisH, supranote 7, at 48, 52-53.
11 Quoted in Lash, supranote 11, at 86.
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once said that all history is biography.8 ' Yeats asserted, even more
extravagantly, that "all knowledge" is.82 Such poetic overstatement
notwithstanding, it is clear that the underlying motive of virtually all

historians-including demographers and econometricians, as well as
those who compile oral histories-is to give us a better picture of what
it was like to live a life in circumstances different from our own.
It is curious, therefore, that scant attention has been paid to
establishing criteria by which to measure a biography's worth. It is,
after all, the one historical medium explicitly concerned with describing other people's lives. Indeed, a recent symposium on biography
noted accurately that it is difficult for the reviewer of a biography even
to stay focused on assessing it. One inevitably begins to consider
instead the subject's significance, or the contradictions in his or her
life. 83 Except in rare instances, the biography itself is an extremely
inconspicuous-indeed almost invisible-medium.
For several important reasons, however, the judicial biographer is
less "invisible" than most. While there is not, and cannot be, a proto-

typical "Supreme Court biography," there is a general model ofjudgeship that provides the judicial biographer with a ready counterpoint or
focus. Simon may be as unconcerned, for example, with the importance of the conventional judicial role as was Douglas, but nonetheless
he feels equally compelled to respond to it. Both individuals have
structured their work as a rebellion (in Simon's case, a rationalization
for rebellion) against it. While Supreme Court biographies indeed tend
'
toward the presentation of "unique congeries of specific instances"84
that leave the would-be institutional analyst ultimately dissatisfied, the

1,
R.

ErmRsoN, History, in ESSAYS: FRST SERIES (1841), reprinted in Tr

SELECTED WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 127 (B. Atkinson ed. 1940). Henry
David Thoreau carried things to an even greater romantic extreme, asserting that
there was no such thing as biography, only autobiography. H. THOREAU, A WEEK ON
THE CONCORD AND MERRmCacK RrVERs 138 (1849) (Signet ed. 1961).
"1Quoted in Edel, The Figurein the Carpet,in TELLiNG LIVEs: THE BroGRAPHER's ART 21 (M. Pachter ed. 1981).
83Id.
84 Murphy, Book Review, 78 YALE L.J. 725, 728 (1969). Murphy himself has
tried both a rather forced political science analysis of the Court, W. MuRPHn, ELEMENTS OF JUDICAl STRATEGY (1974), and a more illuminating narrative by an imaginary Justice, W. MuRPrv, THE VicAR OF CHRIST, 97-286 (1979), as ways of explaining how the Justices argue and barter their way to decisions.
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existence of a deeply rooted (if idealized) model of how the institution
is supposed to work provides a means of organizing these "unique
instances" and of deciding whether the model needs revision. Judges,
more than most public figures, lend themselves to comparative analysis. No two presidents ever face identical choices under identical sets of
facts. Numerous judges frequently must-and do.
There has developed over the years a bifurcation in the public's
perception of the Court that is not strictly, if at all, coincident with
divisions along other social or political lines. Regular Supreme Court
litigators of all persuasions, like most constitutional scholars and former Supreme Court law clerks, know perfectly well that, at any given
moment, the Court is an extremely political institution, both in interpersonal and ideological terms. Their perception is shared by political
extremists of both stripes as well as those who believe, like Mr. Dooley,
that the Supreme Court follows the election returns. 5 Meanwhile, a
majority of practicing lawyers and the educated public tend to view the
Court as primarily a "legal" institution, one that adheres to some relatively discernible corpus of "law."
Hirsch's The Enigma, it seems fair to say, is addressed to those
who have already achieved the sophistication of the first group, while
Simon-a "people's biographer" for a "people's Justice"-does nothing to deflate the preconceptions of the second group. The ultimate
shortcoming of Independent Journey is not the extent to which it
leaves Douglas' career unassessed, but the degree to which its
self-consciously populist rhetoric implicitly confirms and legitimates
the conventional distinction between politics on the one hand and
"law" or legal scholarship on the other. Simon's ultimate message, like
that of other Douglas defenders,86 is that Douglas could vindicate his
11E

DUNNE,

Trm WoRLD

OF MR.

DOOLEY 89 (L. Filler ed. 1962) ("th' supreme

court follows th' iliction returns").
86 See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 11, at 1408-09. While Countryman notes
correctly that legal "scholarship" is not a very precise term, he, like Simon, reinforces
the notion of a clear distinction-and seemingly inevitable opposition-between legal
"scholarship" on the one hand aid "common sense" (i.e., right results) on the other.

In this he concedes too much to critics of Douglas' results in his effort to defend
Douglas the man. Contrary to what Countryman seems to imply, much fine scholarship has been produced by people who would fully support virtually all of Douglas'
results. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, TEm SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXl'RESSION (1970); L.
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substantive values only by rebelling against the rigidities of "law" The
truth is that there is enough flexibility and give, not to mention flimflam, built into present-day constitutional adjudication for a conscientious Justice to satisfy substantive values as well as legal craftsmanship.
Ironically, therefore, IndependentJourney is ultimately a conservative book. Hirsch, who trumpets his liberal sympathies less than
Simon does, simply assumes from the beginning that a strict dichotomy between law and politics does not exist. He directs his energies
toward elaborating a post-realist analysis of judicial decisionmaking,
while Simon merely illustrates why legal realism itself so quickly ran
into an analytical deadend. Unfortunately, Hirsch's failure to include a
coherent narrative in his biography guarantees that only the
already-initiated professional cognoscenti will ever peruse The Enigmat pages. This fact makes the bungling of The Brethrenseem especially regrettable, given the now-lost opportunity that book presented
for mass education concerning the judicial process. Despite the book's
many faults, the authors of The Brethren hit upon the precise
mini-history mode of analysis most appropriate to understanding the
Court as an institution.
The EnigmaofFelixFrankfurterand Independent Journey,considered together with other previously published works, 7 do provide a
basis for beginning a similar mini-history of the Roosevelt, Truman,
and Eisenhower Courts. In doing so, they also help to establish something like a paradigmatic model for evaluating subsequent Courts.
Contrary to the view suggested in The Brethren, the literature now
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978). The problem is that Douglas did

not have much use for conventional scholarship. Interestingly, despite Frankfurter's
considerable reputation as a legal scholar, he was no blind proponent of scholarship
for scholarship's sake. Frankfurter, Book Review, 45 HARv. L. REv. 536 (1932)
("Our law reviews multiply like rabbits, but how much of their content is worth reading two years after publication?"). For Supreme Court Justices, legal scholarship is,
among other things, an ideological and political tool, a means by which results are, or
are not, legitimated. Needlessly slighting such scholarship only gives ammunition to
one's opponents. See generally Symposium, Legal Scholarship:Its Nature andPurposes, 90 YALE L.J. 955 (1981).
11See, e.g., G. DUNNE, HuGo BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977); J.
HOWARD, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY (1968); R. KLUOER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975);
E. WARuN, THE MEmoms oF EARL WARREN (1977), and other works by and about
Douglas and Frankfurter cited at note I1 supra.
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published on the Truman Court demonstrates conclusively that the
Burger Court is, by comparison, a model of interpersonal civility and
tranquility. The present Justices, for example, do not busy themselves
berating each other's ethics in letters to Congress and the press, nor do
they ostentatiously boycott each other's weddings and funerals." Not
that this is particularly important, but it does show, contrary to
recently circulated views, that today's public fragmentation is not necessarily connected with private ill will. At least in part, it reconfirms
the notion that ideas as ideas matter separately, even if most of those
"ideas" embody "emotional predilections"8 9 as well as political, social,
and jurisprudential abstractions.9"
88Both Hirsch and Simon assume that their readers are familiar with the deep
personal divisions present on the Court throughout the forties, fifties, and early sixties. Hirsch repeats Justice Jackson's famous attack on Justice Black, cabled to Congress from Nuremberg when Jackson heard Black was trying to block his nomination
for Chief Justice. H. HnRscH, supra note 9, at 185-86. In the words of another
Supreme Court biographer, it was "the most rancorous display of judicial temper in
nearly a century." J. HowARD,supra note 86, at 392-93. In The Court Years,
Douglas claims that Chief Justice Vinson once became so exasperated with Frankfurter's barbed comments in conference that, in a fit of frustration, "Vinson left his
chair at the head of the Conference Table, raised his clenched fist... shouting 'No
son of a bitch can ever say that to Fred Vinson!.' and was only stopped from
punching Frankfurter by the physical intervention of Justices Shay and Minton.
W DOUGLAS, supra note 11, at 226.
89Chief Justice Hughes is said to have advised Douglas just after he was
appointed to remember that "at the constitutional level where we work, ninety percent of any decision is emotional. The rational part of us supplies the reasons for
supporting our predilections." W, DOUGLAS, TiH COURT YEARS 8(1980).
90 With regard to the history of the post-Roosevelt Court itself, one important
matter on which Douglas and Frankfurter agreed is the special historical significance
of Earl Warren. Warren presents a clear exception to Bickel's suggestion that Justices
are generally time bombs rather than "warheads that explode on impact" A. BICKEL,
supra note 6, at 31. He was appointed to the Court precisely when, as everyone
knew, the issue of racial equality was about to come to the fore, and his position on
civil rights issues was unclear at best. Yet Frankfurter found in Warren a forceful
Chief Justice able to lead the Court into a new and controversial area with unanimity

and cohesion, rather than the seven-to-two (or worse) split that had earlier been

feared. See generallyR. KLUGER, supra note 87, at 543-748; Lash, supranote 11, at
83. Douglas, while impatient with Frankfurter's time-consuming efforts during the
term preceding the Court's decision in Brown to coax unanimity from a reluctant
Vinson Court on ending segregation, found in Warren a valuable ally with a talent
for marshalling votes.
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As Hirsch rightly perceives, Frankfurter's career offers a rich
opportunity for exploring the interplay of ideas, emotions, interpersonal relations, and the legal and cultural traditions of the Supreme
Court. Simon and Hirsch agree that when Frankfurter was appointed
to the Court, the entire legal community, including William 0.
Douglas, expected him to dominate and control it for many years to
come. In a central chapter, "The Unexpected Challenge," 9' Hirsch
explains how this consensus, like the one concerning Frankfurter's civil
libertarianism, swiftly and completely came apart. Appropriately, the
turning point involved the basic symbolism of democracy: the requirement in several states that even Jehovah's Witnesses must salute the
flag.2 As full of idealized notions of patriotism as he was of idealized
notions of the "neutral" jurist, Frankfurter eloquently won over six
brethren, including Black and Douglas, with an extended explication
of a Holmesian theme, the revered figure's well-known assertion, "We
live by symbols."93 Frankfurter and his Gobitis brethren held against
the Witnesses, stating that "the flag is the symbol of our national
unity, transcending all internal differences, however large, within the
framework of the Constitution."94 The precise issue, he said, was
whether all the duly constituted legislative bodies in the land, in a time
of impending war, were barred from passing measures "to evoke that
unifying sentiment without which there can ultimately be no liberties,
civil or religious." 95
In the hailstorm of public and professional criticism that ensued,
Black, Douglas, and the others began to slip away. (Douglas told
Simon he had allowed himself to be duped by Frankfurter's reputation). Their defection, Hirsch says, was accelerated by Frankfurter's
offensively overzealous and condescending efforts to persuade them
not to. By the end of the 1941 Term, only seven months later, Black,
Douglas, and Murphy indicated in no uncertain terms that they had
already changed their minds about Gobitis.91 One Term later, with
11H. HMSCH, supranote 9, at 127-76.
9"Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
91Id. at 596.
94 Id.

11Id. at 597.
91 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 834 (1942).
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Frankfurter now in dissent, they specifically overruled it.97 Eloquently
delineating a position he would hold for the rest of his career, Frankfurter began his dissent with a mingled reference to both his judicial
philosophy and his self-image by noting that "one who belongs to the
most vilified and persecuted minority in history" 8 ought naturally to
endorse the noble libertarian ideals expressed by the majority. But, as a
judge, he said, "my purely personal attitude" is not "relevant:'9 9
Thereafter, in the words of Joseph Lash, Frankfurter was, quite simply, "uncoupled from the locomotive of history"10
This episode in The Enigmavividly conveys how ideas, personalities, and the times can mesh-or not mesh-on the Supreme Court. In
a sense, it dramatizes the notion of judicial "neutrality" by showing
that one man's "personality" ultimately gains him nothing in the collegial context of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, it dramatizes
the power and weakness of individual principle in the face of outside
criticism. Hirsch's discussion of the bloc realignments that Frankfurter's pre-Court reputation, personal manner, and political ideas came to
require as expectations of him changed, and how each of these factors
affected the realignment's pace, provides an illuminating microcosmic
glimpse of the Court, both as a group of personalities and as an institution in action.
The final irony in comparing such different Justices as Frankfurter and Douglas is the extent to which both Douglas' freewheeling
style and Frankfurter's circumspect philosophy of judicial restraint,
though still of academic interest, have otherwise lost all currency. The
irony is all the greater, and Frankfurter's "enigma" all the more tragic,
when one considers that for much of his later career Frankfurter was
explicitly writing for Courts of the future. He was trying to elaborate a
philosophy of adjudication itself rather than simply promulgate specific substantive values.
Superficially, this philosophy would seem to be congenial to a
Court, like the present one, that appears eager to engage in the
retrenchment of civil liberties. Yet that eagerness itself is problematical. The present Court's seemingly unbridled desire to reach predeter9' West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
90 Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
99Id.
"I H. HMRSCH, supra note 9, at 152.
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mined results occasionally outdoes even Douglas'. Thus, the exclu-

sionary rule (which Frankfurter, to be sure, had his qualms about)'0'
has been stripped by the Burger Court of the one justification Frank-

furter might have liked-preserving the integrity of the judicial
process'02 -in order that it may gradually be abolished on allegedly
"utilitarian" grounds. Similarly, for the present, the presumption of
innocence has been diluted," 3 also on "utilitarian" grounds, and judicial integrity has thereby suffered further damage. Abstention and
the other supposedly "passive" virtues have become overtly political"'
at the same time as the Court has manifested, on at least one occasion,
an unprecedented willingness to curtail core first amendment liberties
on certiorari petitions, without argument or briefing, by deciding

questions not properly before it.
101See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 30-31.
I02 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See generallyAmsterdam,

Perspectives on theFourth Amendment, 59 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974); Schrock & Welsh, Up
from Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN.
L. Rnv. 251 (1974).
" See, e.g., Kentucky v. Wharton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (due process does not
require court to instruct jury on presumption of innocence despite specific request by
defendant for such a charge); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detainees
may be subjected to same restrictions on personal privacy and liberty as convicted
inmates as long as state asserts an interest in "institutional security" rather than punishment; eighth amendment does not protect such detainees because they are, by definition, not being "punished" only "detained").
104 See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). For a discussion of the
political effects achieved through this "passivity," as well as the historic reversal of
civil liberties protection it represents, see Soifer & MacGill, The Younger Doctrine:
ReconstructingReconstruction, 55 TEX. L. Rv. 1141 (1977).
oI Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). The government's
crosspetition in Snepp expressly stated that its request for Supreme Court review was
conditioned upon the Court granting Snepp's petition for certiorari. In dissent, Justice Stevens asserted that the Court acted without jurisdiction in granting the government's petition, because Snepp's petition had not been granted. Id. at 524 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). See also Cox, The Supreme Court, 1979 Term-Foreword:Freedom
ofExpressionin the BurgerCourt, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8-11 (1980). Another significant development in this regard is presented by Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332
(1975), where the Burger Court held that its summary dismissal of an appeal for want
of a substantial constitutional question should have binding precedential effect on
lower courts, despite the absence of briefing, oral argument, or a written opinion.
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More remarkable still is the extent to which the rhetoric of
self-restraint has failed to survive. The Burger Court increasingly articulates, usually in the name of "federalism," affirmative approval and
encouragement of statist action against individual rights."0 6 This is
very different from Frankfurter's philosophy of leaving the states free
to follow possibly misguided courses in the belief that correcting mistakes is part of a democratic society's self-education. Though he is frequently excoriated for the outcomes his approach produced, Frankfurter at least appreciated the tragedy inherent in his views. And even
though Douglas' carelessness sometimes hurt precisely those he most
wished to help,' °7 this Wall Street-busting environmentalist, not some
supply-side politician, was the first to remind us that the Constitution's
purpose is "to take government off the backs of the people!" 8 Thus,
Douglas and Frankfurter were in one critical respect alike: unlike some
of their successors, at least they knew that civil rights and civil liberties
matter.
"6See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 101 S. Ct. 2766 (1981)(foreign policy
considerations-not just "national security" concerns-provide sufficient justification for revoking passport). See generallyShapiro, Mr Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HAitv. L. REv. 293 (1976).
07 Douglas' cursory analysis of whether the Reconstruction Congress intended
to make municipalities liable under section 1983, for example, greatly limited civil
rights damage actions for almost two decades, and compares most unfavorably with
the later analysis by Justice Brennan. Compare Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
187-91 (1961) with Monnell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 664-90
(1978).
,"8Schneider v. Smith, 370 U.S. 17, 25 (1968).

